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When the United States Supreme Court used the expression “with all deliberate speed” in the 
case Brown v. Board of Education, it did so presumably because of its vagueness. Many 
jurists, economists, linguists, and philosophers accordingly assume that vagueness can be 
strategically used to one’s advantage. Roy Sorensen has cast doubt on this assumption by 
strictly differentiating between vagueness and generality. Indeed, most arguments for the 
value of vagueness go through only when vagueness is confused with generality. Sorensen 
claims that vagueness – correctly understood – has no function in law inter alia because 
judges lie systematically when confronted with borderline cases. I argue that both claims are 
wrong. First, judges do not need to resort to lying when adjudicating borderline cases, and 
even if they had to, this would not render vagueness useless. Secondly, vagueness has several 
important functions in law such as the reduction of decision costs and the delegation of 
power. Although many functions commonly attributed to the vagueness of legal expressions 
are in fact due to their generality or other semantic properties, vagueness has at least these 
two functions in law. 
1. What Is the Problem? 
It is widely believed that vagueness plays an important role in law. Many jurists, economists, 
linguists, and philosophers claim that vagueness can be strategically used to one’s advantage. 
So called strategic vagueness has been studied generally in communication (cf. Franke 2011 
and de Jaegher 2011), but also specifically in contracts, verdicts and statutes (cf. Staton 2008 
and Choi 2011). 
However, it seems that in most (or even all) cases the utility of vague expressions is due to 
generality rather than vagueness. Roy Sorensen holds that no advantage whatsoever can be 
gained by using vague expressions due to their vagueness (cf. Sorensen 2001). Indeed, many 
arguments for the use of vagueness are convincing only if vagueness is (mis-)understood as 
generality. Thus, if one wants to show that vagueness – correctly understood – has a function, 
one has to make sure that the effects commonly attributed to vagueness are not in fact due to 
something else. 
The primary aim of this paper is to show that there are cases in which we cannot attribute the 
intended positive effects of vague expressions to anything else than their vagueness. Also – as 
a secondary aim – I will argue that judges are not forced to lie because of vagueness. 
2. What Is Vagueness? 
Vagueness is usually characterized by three criteria (cf. Keefe 2000): 
(C1) Borderline Cases 
(C2) Fuzzy Boundaries 
(C3) Sorites Susceptibility 
For this paper’s purposes, however, we will bracket out criteria (C2) und (C3) and focus on 
criterion (C1), since only allowing for borderline cases is universally accepted as a necessary 
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condition for an expression being vague. For instance, Paul Grice influentially defined 
“vagueness” by way of reference to uncertainty in borderline cases: 
To say that an expression is vague [is] to say that there are cases (actual and possible) 
in which one just does not know whether to apply the expression or to withhold it, and 
one’s not knowing is not due to ignorance of the facts. (Grice 1989: 177) 
Thus, we can say that an expression is vague if it admits borderline cases, where borderline 
cases are cases in which the expression neither clearly applies nor clearly does not apply. The 
most common examples of vague expressions given in philosophical contexts are “heap,” 
“bald,” “red,” and in more legal contexts “vehicle” and “reasonable.” An expression which is 
not vague is precise. 
So far, everything said about vagueness is fairly uncontroversial. However, several theories of 
vagueness have been proposed none of which gained any reasonably wide acceptance in the 
philosophical community to count as the mainstream view. One theory of vagueness though 
managed to gain exceptionally little acceptance – this is the epistemic theory of vagueness 
defended by Roy Sorensen, which claims that vagueness is ignorance and that all borderline x 
of F are in fact either F or ¬F, but we cannot know. My objections against Sorensen’s 
arguments are independent of any particular theory of vagueness, but his arguments can only 
properly be understood against the background of his epistemicism. 
In contrast to vagueness, we can define generality by saying that an expression is general if it 
can be applied to a wide variety of cases, where the precise scope of “wide” is relative to some 
context or purpose. For instance, one could say that the expression “person” is general 
because it covers children, biology students, retirees, pianists, millionaires and every Tom, 
Dick and Harry. The opposite of generality is specificity. 
In a nutshell, then, one can say that while vagueness is an expression’s property of allowing 
for borderline cases, generality is an expression’s property of applying to a wide variety of 
cases. Consequently, the properties of vagueness and generality are logically independent, 
that is to say that there are general and precise expressions as well as specific and vague ones. 
However, most ordinary language expressions are both vague and general, which presumably 
is one reason why people tend to confuse vagueness and generality so frequently and 
persistently. 
3. What Are Borderline Cases? 
We said that borderline cases are cases in which a vague expression neither clearly applies 
nor clearly does not apply. Now, we can distinguish between two kinds of borderline cases. 
Philosophers are usually interested only in the possibility of borderline cases. If some case is 
conceivable in which the expression in question neither clearly applies nor clearly does not 
apply, then the expression is vague. 
In law, however, we generally want to minimise the occurrence of actual borderline cases. It 
is notable that only then it is meaningful at all to talk about more or less vague expressions. 
All vague expressions arguably admit indefinitely many possible borderline cases,1 but they 
evidently differ considerably with respect to the number of actual borderline cases – real 
cases which in fact (in the actual world) are unclear. So, an expression can be more or less 
vague with respect to the number of actual borderline cases it generates, but not with respect 
to the number of possible borderline cases. 
                                                        
1 Potential exceptions are expressions like “small natural number,” which allow only a limited number of 
possible borderline cases. 
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Accordingly, we can distinguish between to kinds of vagueness:2 
An expression is intensionally vague if it possibly admits borderline cases. 
An expression is extensionally vague if it actually admits borderline cases. 
There is a second very important distinction. According to Sorensen, some borderline cases 
depend on our epistemological access and can be resolved. These are relative borderline 
cases. Absolute borderline cases, in contrast, cannot be resolved and give rise to vagueness. 
A judge can, for instance, sort all the documents, which are clearly relevant, on one pile, all 
the documents, which are clearly not relevant, on a second pile, and then leaving a pile of 
documents with all the unclear cases in the middle. First, she might continue to find one or 
another relative borderline case in the middle, which can eventually be decided. However, 
those cases that will remain in the middle after exhausting all epistemological means of the 
judge are absolute borderline cases. 
Relative and absolute borderline cases can be defined as follows: 
Absolute Borderline Cases 
An individual x is an absolute borderline F iff given any means of answering “Is x an 
F?” x is borderline. 
Relative Borderline Cases 
An individual x is a relative borderline F iff x is borderline, but can be identified either 
as F or as not F given some answering resource. 
This distinction is crucial for Sorensen, since he maintains that in law relative borderline 
cases have a function, while absolute borderline cases do not. He has the view that vague 
expressions can be useful because they – despite their vagueness – allow for (relative 
borderline) cases that are initially unclear, but can later be resolved in one way only. 
In any case, based on Sorensen’s distinction, we have to adjust our definition of vagueness 
such that an expression is vague if it possibly admits absolute borderline cases. 
3. Do Judges Necessarily Lie? 
Sorensen not only claims that absolute borderline cases are never useful, they also force 
judges to make groundless decisions and eventually to lie: 
Judges cannot discover the correct answer to a question about an absolute borderline 
case because no one can. […] The judge is not permitted just to confess his ignorance; 
the judge is obliged to answer. Therefore, he is obliged to answer insincerely. (Sorensen 
2001: 400) 
According to Sorensen, judges are lying when asserting verdicts on absolute borderline cases, 
since they cannot be justified in believing the truth of their assertions. Judges must decide 
cases that are brought before them, some of which are absolute borderline cases. Hence, 
judges must decide absolute borderline cases, which are by definition undecidable. 
                                                        
2 This distinction is due to Kit Fine, who based it on Rudolf Carnap’s differentiation between an 
expression’s extension and its intension: “A predicate F is extensionally vague if it has borderline cases, 
intensionally vague if it could have borderline cases.” (Fine 1975: 266) Consequently, extensionally 
vague expressions allow cases that neither clearly belong to their extension nor clearly do not. 
Intensionally vague expressions, on the other hand, allow cases that neither clearly belong to their 
intension nor clearly do not. 
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I will now give a semi-formal reconstruction of his argument consisting of two parts. The first 
part establishes that necessarily judges cannot know statements about absolute borderline 
cases: 
(P1) x is an absolute borderline F. 
(P2) Nobody can know F(x) if x is an absolute borderline F. 
(K1) Thus, judge J cannot know that F(x). (from (P1)-(P2)) 
This seems to be rather unproblematic. Nobody can know whether a statement about an 
absolute borderline case is true or false, not even a highly qualified judge. This is also 
plausible if one does not submit to Sorensen’s background assumption that vagueness is 
ignorance, that is, to his epistemicism. 
The second more problematic part of the argument seeks to establish that judges are 
necessarily insincere in absolute borderline cases: 
(P3) Judge J’s verdict is an assertion that F(x). 
(P4) Judge J does not believe that F(x). (from (K1)) 
(P5) Judge J has the intention that some X ≠ J shall be led to believe that F(x). 
(P6) Some Y lies with respect to F(x) if Y asserts that F(x), while not believing that F(x), 
with the intention that some X ≠ Y shall be led to believe that F(x). 
(K2) Thus, judge J lies with respect to F(x). (from (P3)-(P6)) 
If we accept premises (P3) to (P6), we have to accept Sorensen’s claim that judges necessarily 
lie when adjudicating absolute borderline cases. Thus, if we don’t accept the conclusion, we 
have to dismiss one of the premises. Are all premises (P3) to (P6) plausible? 
One might argue that premise (P4) is not entailed by conclusion (K1), since one can believe 
something without being able to know it. However, a judge who finds out that she cannot 
know the verdict should not believe it. So, premise (P4) is entailed by conclusion (K1) if it is 
assumed that the judge has a relative high standard of belief justification with respect to her 
verdict. It is not necessary to assume that the judge needs to actually know that she cannot 
know the verdict. The judge must only try hard enough and fail, in order to establish that she 
is not justified to believe it. Hence, the judge would not believe something she has grounds to 
think she does not know: 
(K1) Judge J cannot know that F(x). 
(S1) Judge J does not know that F(x). 
(S2) Judge J is not justified to believe that F(x). 
(P4) Judge J does not believe that F(x). 
Thus, we should accept premise (P4) because judges have a particular high standard of belief 
justification. Of course, there are actual judges who neglect this standard; probably a lot of 
judges believe all sorts of things. But, one can hardly say that they do it systematically. 
Maybe, then, the definition of lying which Sorensen uses is inadequate. In this case, premise 
(P6) should be rejected because having the intention to make someone else believe something 
one doesn’t know is not sufficient for lying. Perhaps lying necessarily involves intentional 
deception. However, the argument can be restated with different premises (P5*) and (P6*) 
just as well such that: 
(P5*) Judge J has the intention to deceive some X ≠ J such that X shall believe that F(x). 
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(P6*) Some Y lies with respect to F(x) if Y asserts that F(x), while not believing that F(x), 
with the intention to deceive some X ≠ Y such that X shall believe that F(x). 
Then (K2) would still be entailed by the premises and the judge’s verdict would count as lying. 
Yet a different definition of lying has been proposed by Jason Glenn: 
[W]hen one lies one deliberately states a negation of what they know (or think they 
know) to be the case. (Glenn 2007) 
So understood, conclusion (K2) cannot be derived because in an absolute borderline case the 
judge does not come to knowledge at all. Consequently, she does not state its negation. 
However, this change in definition seems to suggest that some kind of insincerity on the part 
of the judge remains, and Glenn concedes that judges bullshit when adjudicating absolute 
borderline cases.3 
This is a possible objection to Sorensen’s argument. On one hand, though, this definition of 
lying is rather restrictive, ruling out cases in which one is asserting something one has good 
reason not to believe in order to deceive somebody else. Even if one might normally call this 
lying, the distinction to bullshitting is a useful one and perhaps one should change how one 
uses the expression “lying.” On the other hand, we then would have to agree that judges 
systematically bullshit in absolute borderline cases which is only slightly more plausible than 
having them lying. 
Luckily, there is an alternative; namely, one can reject premise (P3) and argue that judicial 
verdicts are not mere assertions of facts of the matter. They are surely speech acts asserting 
what the law in a particular case is, but they are also (equally surely) speech acts ascribing 
legal character to the facts found, declaring the institutional fact of guilt, and (in hard cases) 
creating new law (cf. Bernal 2007). Thus, verdicts are not true or false in the same way as 
descriptions or claims about the world are.4 
In hard cases judicial verdicts are often both assertions of what the law is and advancements 
to existing law. Even though judge-made law is a controversial phenomenon (especially in 
Germany), judges are frequently quasi-lawmakers and their verdicts are not directly subject 
to truth or falsity. What the German Federal Constitutional Court or the United States 
Supreme Court decides is not only final in the sense that it cannot be appealed to, but also 
generally binding for future cases. 
But also in clear cases, a judge’s ruling is not just a literal application of the law. It is 
argumentation inter alia about which aspects of an expression’s meaning are relevant in a 
particular case.5 But this is neither fixed by semantics nor pragmatics. Judges can justify their 
decisions by bringing in linguistic and extra-linguistic as well as legal and extra-legal 
arguments. Vague legal expressions are highly multi-dimensional and it is not determinate 
which dimension prevails in a particular context.6 Taking into account possible intentions of 
                                                        
3 Glenn follows Harry Frankfurt in his definition of “bullshitting:” “When one is bullshitting, the only 
thing that one deceives another about is one’s attitude towards the mode of presentation of one’s claims 
about a certain subject matter, and not the subject matter itself.” (Glenn 2007; cf. Frankfurt 2005) 
4 This does not mean that verdicts are a kind of assertion without truth-value – as for instance Woozley 
suggested (cf. Woozley 1979: 30). 
5 Of course, legal expressions can attain quite different meanings than the ones of their everyday 
counterparts (cf. Poscher 2009). A precise threshold for legal age can be introduced to reduce absolute 
borderline cases. Because this is stipulated by the lawmaker, it might get in conflict with our vague 
everyday concept of maturity. Consequently, natural language and legal expressions often diverge in 
meaning. 
6 For instance, the expression “heap” is often considered to be one-dimensional; its application depends 
on the number of grains. But actually it is at least two-dimensional, as it depends also on their 
arrangement. Most legal expressions have indeterminately many dimensions. 
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the lawmaker or the purpose of the law can enable judges to honestly believe their verdicts to 
be justified, even when facing absolute borderline cases. 
When adjudicating both clear and hard cases, judges usually give all relevant reasons of why a 
particular decision was reached. Insofar as there is any systematic deception when absolute 
borderline cases are concerned, a judge might try to implicate that her and only her decision 
was required by the law (cf. Bix 2003: 105). Hence, judges might decide absolute borderline 
cases relying on reasons which they actually believe to be conclusive, but objectively are not. 
Based on similar considerations, Scott Altman argues that judges should be candid but not 
introspective: 
By candid, I mean never being consciously duplicitous. Candid opinions do not offer 
reasons judges know do not persuade them. By introspective, I mean critically 
examining one’s mental states to avoid any self-deception or error. (cf. Altman 1990: 
297) 
Thus, judges can honestly and sincerely decide absolute borderline cases, even if the law does 
not require any particular verdict because of its vagueness. The vagueness of the law does not 
force judges to abandon candor, but it might require a certain abstinence of introspection. 
In conclusion, Sorensen’s argument for judicial insincerity is unsound because premise (P3) 
neglects the pragmatic, legal, and argumentative aspects of the judge’s speech act when 
adjudicating a (borderline) case.7 
4. Has Vagueness Really No Function in Law? 
Sorensen’s main argument against a positive function of vagueness in law can be 
reconstructed in this very straightforward way: 
(P1) Vagueness is ignorance. 
(P2) Ignorance has no (relevant) function in law. 
(K1) Thus, vagueness has no (relevant) function in law. 
Premise (P1) is, given the huge community of non-epistemicists, (at least) highly 
controversial. The vast majority of vagueness theorists is convinced that vagueness is (some 
kind of) semantic phenomenon. However, vague expressions create uncertainty on whether to 
apply them in borderline cases, and the view that there is a single right answer to every legal 
question is not as controversial as ordinary language epistemicism is (cf. Dworkin 1978). 
Premise (P2) seems to be somewhat problematic as well. Job applications are often 
anonymously submitted because of unconscious bias. It usually allows for better judgement of 
the job applicant’s abilities not knowing his or her name, age, gender, appearance or place of 
birth. The judge’s judgement of the accused can be similarly biased. Thus, ignorance can 
facilitate fairer and less biased judgements. However, this kind of ignorance is strikingly 
different from the kind of irremediable ignorance Sorensen associates with vagueness, since 
in the former case it is ignorance of certain seemingly relevant, but effectively irrelevant facts 
that are unknown. Hence, vagueness related ignorance can hardly be said to play any relevant 
role in these kinds of circumstances. 
Based on these considerations, should we accept Sorensen’s conclusion that vagueness has no 
relevant function in law? Can we refute his claim only by proving epistemicism wrong? In 
                                                        
7 If premise (P3) is rejected, premise (P4) cannot be defended either. Even though judges should have 
high standards of belief, if verdicts are not simple assertions, they can gather convincing reasons for a 
particular one such that they come to justifiably believe it to be determined by the law, while in fact it is 
not. Thus, one could after all dismiss step (S2) of the argument from (K1) to (P4). 
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fact, I think that one can reject Sorensen’s conclusion without committing oneself to any 
particular view of vagueness. The reason is that not even an epistemicist should accept 
premise (P1) as it is put forward in the argument. Generally the term “ignorance” implies 
that there is something to know that one is ignorant of. But even if there is a fact of the matter 
in absolute borderline cases (as epistemicists claim), nobody could possibly know it – 
according to Sorensen, not even God. Hence, vagueness is not simply ignorance, and premise 
(P1) must be rejected. 
I will now positively argue that vagueness has a (relevant) function in law by focusing on an 
example which Sorensen himself used in his argumentation and Jamie Tappenden originally 
introduced to the philosophical debate for an argument against epistemicism (cf. Tappenden 
1994). If my argument is successful, the contrary conclusion that vagueness has a (relevant) 
function in law together with premise (P2) entails that vagueness is not ignorance. First, 
however, I will point out what functions of vagueness I have in mind. 
Sorensen’s argument against the value of vagueness in law focuses primarily on the role of the 
judge, while neglecting the role of the legislator. The creation of absolute borderline cases can 
effectively be used by the legislator to reduce decision costs and save time for more important 
issues (cf. Poscher 2012). The use of vague expressions in law seems to allow some questions 
to remain open, while giving general guidance. In absolute borderline cases judges and 
authorities have the requisite discretion to decide either way – precisely because there is 
nothing to be found or to be known. Lawmakers delegate power to judges and authorities who 
are often confronted with situations they had no time to consider or simply did not foresee. 
Even if this brings potential arbitrariness on behalf of the judge when exercising discretion 
and deciding hard cases, it reduces arbitrariness on behalf of the lawmakers when setting 
unjustifiable precise thresholds (cf. Endicott 2005). 
Vague expressions evidently possess the functions pointed out above. However, it could be 
the case – as Sorensen pointed out – that these functions are due to other (coincident) 
properties of vague expressions than their vagueness. Consequently, I will argue now that 
neither relative borderline cases nor generality could possibly achieve these functions and, 
hence, it must be absolute borderline cases, i.e. vagueness proper, that provide for them.8 
Sorensen claims that the “relative borderline cases are doing the work and the absolute 
borderline cases are epiphenomenal” (Sorensen 2001: 397). The case Brown v. Board of 
Education 349 U.S. 294 (1955), which Sorensen cites to support his claim, was the follow-up 
of the United States Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
in which the Supreme Court declared state laws unconstitutional that established separate 
public schools for black and white students. 
When the Supreme Court ruled the second Brown case in 1955, it could not know how long 
and difficult the desegregation process would be, so it did not want to decide immediately. 
That is why it used the infamous expression “with all deliberate speed.” Sorensen takes the 
Court’s decision as evidence for the deliberate use of relative borderline cases in the task of 
power delegation. Future courts are confronted with cases one by one and can gather much 
more information about each of them than the Supreme Court could generally. Future courts 
can then easily sort the clear cases and the relative borderline ones and decide them 
individually, while the absolute borderline cases would be an unavoidable and unwanted by-
product. Since what use would it be to facilitate absolute borderline cases in which there is a 
fact of the matter but no one can ever find out about it? 
                                                        
8 Of course, there are other potentially functional properties of vague expressions than being general, 
having relative borderline cases and having absolute borderline cases. However, so far in the 
philosophical discussion only generality and relative borderline cases have been suggested as functional 
properties which might be confused with vagueness. 
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This is where I think Sorensen’s epistemicism leads him and us (if we believe him so far) 
astray. When the Supreme Court decided that schools must be integrated with all deliberate 
speed, it really could not anticipate how long it would take even progressive schools under the 
best possible circumstances. For this reason, it used a general and vague expression, deciding 
on an indeterminate and longish time period. As Sorensen admits, “the Supreme Court coped 
with borderline cases of ‘all deliberate speed’ by waiting them out” (Sorensen 2001: 396). 
While the expression’s generality provided wide applicability, its vagueness gave a margin of 
discretion to schools. This discretion cannot be given by relative borderline cases. 
Theoretically, the Court could have ascertained all relative borderline cases in advance. Thus, 
assuming that there were no absolute borderline cases, all subsequent cases would have had 
only one correct way to decide them and the Court would have known it beforehand. But this 
is not what the Court had in mind; it wanted to provide some flexibility to account for 
unforeseen cases, varying circumstances and political hindrances. As Chief Justice Earl 
Warren expressed it: 
There were so many blocks preventing an immediate solution […] that the best we 
could look for would be a progression of action; and to keep it going, in a proper 
manner, we adopted that phrase, all deliberate speed. (Scheiber 2007: 17) 
In contrast to generality and relative borderline cases, absolute borderline cases leave some 
questions actually open. If the ruling would have made use of generality or relative borderline 
cases alone, the more regressive and conservative schools might have been let to integrate 
with the objectively slowest allowed speed, which was certainly not what the court wanted to 
achieve – only absolute borderline cases can account for unforeseen cases and varying 
circumstances because only they effectively delegate power. 
Sorensen’s argument can also be presented in a different way. Hrafn Asgeirsson interprets it 
as claiming that the delegation of power is valuable only if the delegates are in a better 
position to resolve a borderline case than the delegator (Asgeirsson 2012). But in absolute 
borderline cases no one is by definition in any position to resolve them. Consequently, the 
delegation of power by way of absolute borderline cases is not valuable. 
Asgeirsson rejects Sorensen’s claim, however, by arguing that the delegation of power is 
valuable even if the delegates are not in a better position to resolve a borderline case than the 
delegator. He agrees with Sorensen that absolute borderline cases prompt judicial discretion 
and that this discretion is due to an implicit or explicit change in question. In an absolute 
borderline case one asks not whether some x is F, but whether some x should count as F. 
Asgeirsson, then, goes on to argue that this question changing discretion prompted by 
absolute borderline cases is valuable by pointing out that “being in a better position” does not 
need to be understood solely epistemically; that the delegator is in a better position to resolve 
a case than the delegates does not necessarily mean that she has better knowledge than them. 
Instead, one should understand “being in a better position” as having better tools to find the 
answer or having lower decision costs. Then it becomes evident that a judge deciding an 
actual (absolute borderline) case has in fact usually better resources and more information 
about the particular case than the lawmaker. Hence, it can be sensible for the lawmaker to 
enact a vague law that reduces her own decision costs and gives discretion to the judges who 
can decide actual (absolute borderline) cases more individually and less costly. 
From this argument it becomes obvious that both Sorensen’s argument for the necessary 
insincerity of judges and the one against the function 0f vagueness in law share the same 
misleading conception of what verdicts are. In both cases, it is assumed that verdicts are mere 
assertions of what the law is, while for every case there is a (legal) fact of the matter. Only 
then it makes sense to talk about judges not being in a better (epistemic) position to decide 
the case than the lawmaker. Once we have done away with this conception and accepted that 
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verdicts in absolute borderline cases are real decisions because there is no question to be 
answered, we will see that vagueness has a function in law. 
But even if one is not convinced by my view of what verdicts are and sides with Sorensen on 
this point, it should have become clear that the United States Supreme Court intentionally 
chose the vague phrase “with all deliberate speed” inter alia to allow judges to decide 
particular cases at their discretion, and the intentional use of this phrase cannot be explained 
by any other phenomenon than its vagueness. 
5. What Is the Lesson? 
In summary, judges do not need to resort to lying when ruling absolute borderline cases 
because the speech act of delivering a judgement is not a mere assertion and is, thus, not 
directly subject to truth and falsity. 
One can argue that judges invoke Dworkinian principles when adjudicating absolute 
borderline cases, and there is a single right answer, though it is not determined by the 
relevant laws alone (cf. Dworkin 1978). The vagueness of legal expressions demands then the 
application of Dworkinian principles, which provide flexibility inasmuch as they presumably 
change over time, but not by giving judicial discretion. One can also argue, along Hartian 
lines, that there are various right answers in an absolute borderline case, even though none is 
the single true one (cf. Hart 1961). In this case, judges have real discretion, since they can use 
legal and extra-legal principles, welfare considerations, moral and ethical beliefs, and many 
other reasons. Both positions are compatible with the arguments for the value of vagueness 
presented in this paper, although a Dworkinian framework would require some adjustments. 
The arguments I have made are also compatible with Sorensen’s epistemicism as well as with 
any other theory of vagueness. Independently of one’s own approach to vagueness it should 
have become evident that vagueness has a relevant function in law because it can be (and 
actually is) used by lawmakers in order to reduce decision costs and to delegate power by 
giving discretion. This deliberate use of vague language can neither be explained by reference 
to the generality of the language nor to its allowing merely relative borderline cases. 
David Lanius 
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin 
david.lanius@hu-berlin.de 
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